Resistance to Gas Pipelines Spreading / Public News Service
March 23, 2015
Resistance to Gas Pipelines Spreading / Public News Service.
Gas Drilling Awareness for Cortland County
July 8, 2013
May 7, 2012
Landowner Can Sue Shell Over Fracking Hazards |
July 25, 2011
RE: frack water recycling: They power huge lights that light of the pads for the whole night. They don’t use street electric but generators which contribute to the noise. The trucks have large pumps that due to the volume of 5200 gallons per truck are large motors, the trucks endlessly are using their backup safety beepers, horns for instructions to the ground crew, etc. The three sites in our neighborhood will generate 800 trucks a day, 1600 with return trip passes.
Complete Interview:
1. Pollution of your well (two wells?). How did this show up?
2. The operations end up being more extensive than anticipated. The “pads” are large, and end up being used for other operations.
3. Extensive light pollution due to 24/7 operation.
4. Extensive trucking.
5. Feel free to add any other relevant details.
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April 25, 2011
Banning Hydrofrackingg Is Not A “Taking” of Property
By Mary Jo Long, Esq.
As the public sentiment grows for a ban on High Volume Hydrofracking (HVHF), lawyers and others who speak for corporate profit-making opportunities in natural gas say that laws banning or limiting gas drilling is a “taking” of property. Even some who seem to be on our side make the same claim. This claim is groundless and misguided. It is a scare tactic to prevent public pressure on our elected officials against HVHF.
What is the Legal Status of These Claims?
Consider the Source
The claim that the government (fed, state or local) will be sued to recover the value of lost property is made by attorneys and others supporting HVHHF as a method of gas drilling. They say that we, the taxpayers, will have to pay for the lost profits due to the government’s taking of their property. Always bear in mind that lawyers are advocates for their clients. When a Landowners’ Coalition lawyer claims that a ban will be a taking, that lawyer is making an argument in support of his client’s position. Making a claim (I’m going to sue you) doesn’t mean that a lawsuit will really happen nor that a Court will agree with the argument if an actual lawsuit is filed.
What Is the Law on Taking Property by the Government
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides certain protections to persons. Included in the protections is the phrase “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”[i] This is the “taking” referred to by the anti-ban people. This obligation to compensate for taking private property only applied to the federal government until the 14th Amendment to the Constitution expanded the application to state governments as well. Eminent domain is the term most frequently used when a government takes a piece of property: land for a public park, a public road, a public school, etc. The owner of the land is entitled to be paid for the value of the land taken from her. Historical evidence suggests that the original intent of the takings clause did not include mere restrictions on use.
But what if the government, say through a town zoning law or a state law, BANS gas drilling without taking over title to the property where gas companies and gas leaseholders expect to drill for gas? Are governmental laws that restrict the use of the land by restricting a profit making opportunity a “taking” when actual ownership does not change?
The notion that one can do anything he wants on his property is not the law of the land. The US Supreme Court has said “all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community.” Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) This principle still remains the law of the land even as Court rulings on “takings” have muddied the waters.[ii]
A town government can use its police power[iii] and zoning/land use power to restrict and prohibit uses that it considers to be detrimental to the community. The exercise of these powers does not constitute a “taking.” For example, the Town of Hempstead passed a law prohibiting gravel pit from excavating below the town’s water table. This law was upheld in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) as a valid use of the town’s police power. The Supreme Court conceded that the law completely prohibited a prior use by Mr. Goldblatt who had operated a gravel pit for 30 years. But the Court held that depriving the property of its most profitable use does not make the law unconstitutional, nor a taking.
The present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be taken for public use without compensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.” Goldblatt at p.593 quoting Mugler v. Kansas.
In 1992 the Supreme Court carved out an exception to this concept in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. The Supreme Court expanded the right to be compensated when new laws deprived land of all economically beneficial use. Although Lucas still owned the land, a lower court at trial had found that the property was rendered of zero value by the law which prohibited residential construction beyond a baseline on the beachfront. While the Supreme Court described these as “relatively rare situations”[iv], it has encouraged litigation. At the same time as Lucas slightly expanded the takings doctrine it also reaffirmed the principle that government does not have to pay compensation when it limits “harmful or noxious uses” of property.
It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that ‘harmful or noxious uses’ of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation. . . .[G]overnment may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate – a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State’s police power”[v]
The Court further acknowledged that Lucas would not be entitled to compensation even though he was deprived of all economically beneficial use if his “bundle of rights” did not include the prohibited use to begin with.[vi] Some uses of land are not a part of the land title to begin with. When someone owns property the owner does not have the property right to have a common law nuisance. Government actions that abate common law nuisances are per se not takings. The Court acknowledged there are inherent limits on landowner rights, imposed under background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance. Thus government can still forbid deleterious uses even to the point of total takings.
Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Lucas, says that a “total taking” of personal property would be subject to a lower standard “by reason of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings”[vii] This means that there is no claim of a taking based on a gas lease, which is personal property rather than real property, i.e. land.
Those opposing a ban on hydrofracking base their claims of a “taking” on Lucas but subsequent cases have confirmed the narrowness of the ruling in Lucas.
Conclusion
A municipality is not obliged to permit the exploitation of any and all natural resources within the town as a permitted use if limiting that use is a reasonable exercise of its police power to prevent damage to the rights of others and to promote the interests of the community as a whole. (at page 684)
[i] “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
[ii] In 1922 the Supreme Court ruled that the Pennsylvania legislature had overstepped the line by enacting a law forbidding people from removing coal from under other people’s houses and was held to effect a taking. The Court said, “While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415. In 1987 the Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 held that a nearly identical law was not a taking. Property is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community. That principle, the court held, does not require compensation whenever the state asserts its power to enforce a prohibition that is injurious to the community. It is a question that “necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.” (pp. 491-492)
[iii] Police power is the power to regulated persons and property for the purpose of securing the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, peace and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants. This include prevention, suppression and abatement of public nuisances, including street nuisances and air pollution, preservation of the public peace and tranquility, protection of the public health through sanitation and disposal of waste and from the harmful effects of industrial and commercial development and proper growth of the municipality through zoning. Article IX of the NY State Constitution; Section 10 of the Municipal Home Rule Law; Section 130 of the Town Law; Section 20 of the General City Law and Section 4-412 of the Village Law.
[iv] Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, at p. 1018
[v]Lucas at p. 1022-1023 citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)
[vi] Lucas at p. 1027.
[vii] Lucas at 1027.
March 5, 2011
With the recent increase in activity in the oil and gas industry in Pennsylvania, disputes between developers and landowners over the interpretation of oil and gas leases are inevitable. In its most recent opinion on the subject, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that landowners properly terminated leases where the developer had not commenced drilling by the end of the primary term of the lease. In so holding, the Court concluded that continued delay rental payments after expiration of the primary term did not extend the term of the lease.
In Hite v. Falcon Partners, et al., 2011 WL 9632 (January 4, 2011), the landowners had entered leases with a developer in December 2002 and October 2003. The leases contained the following provision, which identified a primary term and also incorporated a traditional habendum clause (providing that lease term continues “so long thereafter” as oil or gas is produced) and a delay rental clause:
3. Term. Lessee has the right to enter upon the Property to drill for oil and gas at any time withinone [sic] (1) year from the date hereof and as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is produced from the Property, or as operations continue for the production of oil or gas, or as Lessee shall continue to pay Lessors two ($2.00) dollars per acre as delayed rentals, or until all oil and gas has been removed from the Property, whichever shall last occur.
Drilling never commenced on the property; instead, the developer (and its assignees) continued to pay delay rentals to the landowners for a period of five years. After obtaining offers from other developers and complying with the right of renewal clauses in the leases, the landowners declared that the leases were terminated.
The Court first reviewed the history of oil and gas lease interpretation in Pennsylvania stretching back to the 19th century. In reviewing this history, the Court concluded that delay rental provisions “have a well settled meaning” — that is, to provide something to the landowner in lieu of royalties from production. The Court further found that these clauses “typically” are concerned with the primary term of the lease only, and it reviewed all of the reasons why such clauses typically are restricted to a lease’s primary term. Historically, the delay rentals clause was developed not only to provide some compensation to the landowner, but also to limit the period in which drilling may be delayed. If delay rentals could be used to extend a lease indefinitely, the lease essentially would be a “no term” lease and may unreasonably restrict the landowner’s ability to use or transfer the land.
Based on this history, the Court concluded, “[t]o find as Falcon urges, that it may pay delay rental indefinitely, thereby denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to reap the financial benefits of actual production, would be contrary to the decisions of our Courts, at odds with the presumed intention of the parties in executing the leases in the first place, and in stark contrast to the clear opinion of the courts of Pennsylvania that the obligation to pay delay rentals is intended to ‘spur the lessee toward development.'”
Although the Court based its decision on a long line of cases interpreting oil and gas leases, the clause at issue in this case was not a typical clause. The standard oil and gas lease has been modified many times over the years, but most modern leases include habendum and delay rental clauses that are separate and apart from the clause which defines the primary term of the lease. In this case, all these clauses were combined into one “term” clause. As a result of this structure, the lease could have been interpreted in a different manner. In particular, the Court could have found that, because the delay rental clause was included in the same clause that defined the primary term, the parties intended for the delay rentals to extend the primary term.
Interestingly, the Court stated that the unusual lease language compelled its decision: “Specifically, the language pertaining to the one year primary term and the delay rental due on an annual basis, used in conjunction, is not typical, and, as we will explain, require us to affirm the lower court’s summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.” To the contrary, however, the Court’s decision appears to be based not on the specific language of the lease, but on the historical interpretation of oil and gas leases generally. Even if the Court focused on the specific language at issue, it would have been very reluctant to issue a ruling that would allow a developer to extend the primary term indefinitely, at least absent the clear intent of the parties.
This decision suggests that the courts may focus less on the specific language of a particular lease and more on the principles underlying the development of modern oil and gas leases. While this may provide more consistency for landowners and the oil and gas industry, it may make it more difficult to deviate from standard lease constructions unless the parties’ intentions are spelled out clearly in the lease.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.