Town of Ithaca Comments on SGEIS

Town of Ithaca Comments.pdf (application/pdf Object).

http://www.tompkins-co.org/tccog/Gas_Drilling/Public Hearing Comments/Town of Ithaca Comments.pdf

TOWN OF ITHACA
COMMENTS ON THE REVISED DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (sGEIS)
ON OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING

ADOPTED NOVEMBER 21, 2011

Note: The comments submitted are only those feasible within the time period allowed for comments. Limited staff and elected officials’ time was inadequate to fully digest the 1000 plus pages of material. Thus, the comments submitted are not comprehensive and reflect those elements of the sGEIS that, for the most part, most directly affect the Town of Ithaca. Numerical notes in parentheses refer to specific sections of the sGEIS.

MUNICIPAL WATER

Of overwhelming concern to the Town of Ithaca is the threat to municipal surface water supplies. Well water in this area is often difficult to obtain in sufficient quantity and is of spotty quality. The Town is home to the three biggest municipal water supplies in Tompkins County: the City of Ithaca (Six Mile Creek), Cornell University (Fall Creek) and the Southern Cayuga Lake Intermunicipal Water Commission (aka Bolton Point), which serves the Town of Ithaca, the Town of Dryden, the Town of Lansing, the Village of Cayuga Heights and the Village of Lansing. Additional water is provided to the southern end of the Town of Ulysses. Any pollution of these water supplies would be a calamity of unparalleled proportions and no amount of remediation or compensation could replace the loss of these drinking water sources. Surface water – and the contaminants carried by it – flows downhill and therefore the entire watershed must be considered. Furthermore the rationale that the New York City and Syracuse water supplies are unfiltered and thus different is odd on its face: none of the municipal water plants are capable of filtering or otherwise removing potential contaminants resulting from gas drilling activity. Besides, the setbacks proposed for these two water supplies are not sufficiently protective. Therefore the setback provisions for drilling (7.1.12.1, Page 7-75 and 7.1.12.2 page 7-76 and Page 7-78) are wholly inadequate. Any gas industry activity within the watersheds of any municipal water supply must be prohibited.

HOME RULE

The DEC should expressly support the right of local municipalities under Home Rule to determine land use within municipal borders, including where or whether natural gas development occurs, consistent with zoning and comprehensive planning. (8.1.1) The DEC should explicitly state that if the applicant for a gas drilling permit encounters local laws, regulations and policies that are inconsistent with their proposal, the DEC will respect the municipality’s position and deny the permit. (8.1.1.5)

REGULATIONS AND THE sGEIS

New York State’s SEQRA law provides for the gathering of environmental information to inform the creation of regulations and prior to the implementation of projects. DEC’s proposal to write and perhaps promulgate regulations concurrently with the SEQRA review certainly violates the intent of the law and may invite legal challenge.

EXTRACTION AND AD VALOREM TAXES

All other states other than New York and Pennsylvania have an extraction tax of between 7% and 25%. Local municipalities (not to mention NYS) have already expended hundreds of thousands – if not millions – of dollars preparing for the expansion of the gas industry. An extraction tax of at least 12% must be imposed in order to pay for NYS’s regulation, inspection and enforcement of the gas industry and local municipalities’ costs as a result of the impact of gas drilling. The 12% tax should be evenly divided between the state and the local municipalities. The ad valorem tax should be increased to at least 8% and at least 4% go to towns, which are the level of government which must absorb most of the costs of gas drilling.

 

HEALTH

The sGEIS does not require or refer to an analysis of public health impacts despite the fact that fracking-related air pollution and the potential for water contamination may have serious effects on people-especially the elderly and children – and communities downwind and downstream of proposed fracking operations. There is growing evidence of negative health impacts related to gas extraction in other states. The DEC in its sGEIS must undertake further review of fracking and the impacts of horizontal drilling to ensure that all environmental and public health impacts are mitigated or avoided.
As suggested by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) in its 12/30/2009 commentary on the dSGEIS, the DEC should actively involve the NYS Department of Health in the review process. Local departments of health should also be involved. Indeed, the problems associated with shale gas development near housing have only recently been catalogued as drilling has moved into suburban locations and farming communities.

DEC STAFFING AND MANAGEMENT

The DEC has an inherent conflict of interest since it is charged to “conserve, improve and protect New York’s natural resources and environment and to prevent, abate and control water, land and air pollution, in order to enhance the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state and their overall economic and social well-being,” but it also issues gas drilling permits which has been shown in other areas to likely harm the environment. These functions must be separated.
New York State DEC has been subject to steep budget and staff cuts and does not have adequate staff or resources to properly oversee fracking, even if every possible protection were in place This reality raises the possibility that the DEC will be forced to cut corners with its reviews or fast-track permits despite the risks. Therefore permitting must not take place until the DEC is fully staffed with a clear funding stream to support that staff.
The thousands of miles of pipelines (and compressor stations required for drilling) to get the resulting gas to market will be reviewed by a different agency under a different process. Without an accounting of such impacts, New York’s environmental assessment is incomplete and the full impact of fracking is unknown. The Public Service Commission (PSC) has jurisdiction over gas infrastructure. As such, Governor Cuomo should direct state agencies to coordinate their efforts in order to protect our air, water and communities. It should be stated explicitly in the regulations that any gathering lines not regulated by the PSC are under the jurisdiction of local municipalities (8.1.2.1, page 8-4).

CUMULATIVE IMPACTS FOR WATER WITHDRAWALS

The sGEIS addresses cumulative impacts for water withdrawals by using the pass-by flow determinations; however, the sGEIS needs to address cumulative impacts on water resources in all areas. Although the Water Resources Bill passed in 2011 would address cumulative impacts of groundwater and surface water withdrawals when and if regulations are developed, rules governing water withdrawal permits must be developed before permits are issued for drilling. Without the permitting framework for water withdrawals, it is not possible to determine if there are adequate safeguards for surface water and groundwater.

CUMULATIVE IMPACTS FOR ALL INTERCONNECTED DRILLING ACTIVITIES

In its 12/30/2009 comments USEPA suggested that analysis of cumulative impacts be “greatly expanded.” A process needs to be established to address impacts from all interconnected activities, including drilling operations, that are regulated by DEC and pipelines and compressor stations that are regulated by the Public Service Commission (PSC). An Environmental Impact Statement for the gas lines and compressor stations must be performed by the PSC to assess the cumulative impacts on water resources, community infrastructure and quality of life issues such as noise, road damage and air quality from the additional pipelines and compressor stations that will be needed to transport the gas from the thousands of individual well pads to the regional pipelines. Compressor stations will be needed, with pipelines from each well to the compressor station, and additional pipelines from the compressor station to the main transmission line. However, the sGEIS does not address the impacts of the pipelines or compressor stations necessitated by well drilling operations. The impact of the vast network of access roads, pipelines and compressor stations must be addressed by the sGEIS. The sGEIS identifies the PSC as the responsible agency to oversee construction and protection of the environment for pipeline construction. This segmentation of the environmental impact assessment makes it difficult for decision makers and the public to adequately assess the total environmental impacts anticipated from gas drilling activities.

PROGRAM TO MONITOR AND PROTECT DRINKING WATER RESOURCES

Proper monitoring and assessment strategies must be in place to protect the State’s water resources, and sufficient laboratory capabilities for analysis must be in place prior to drilling.The state currently does not have a strategy in place for data collection and analysis. Such a strategy is key to developing a comprehensive regulatory process that must be in place prior to drilling. All stakeholders (regulatory personnel, drilling companies, and the public) need to be ensured that valid data are being collected and disseminated in a cost effective manner. Considering the volume of environmental and public health data that will be generated by gas drilling, it is essential that NYS Department of Health develop and manage comprehensive databases in order to facilitate effective, comprehensive oversight and public protection during gas drilling. A program must be developed for electronic sharing of monitoring data and must be shared with local health departments as they will be the agency first contacted if any contamination is detected.

PERMIT RE-EVALUATION

The NYSDEC re-evaluation of specified permit conditions in two or three years should involve public review and comment.

OTHER LOW PERMEABILITY SHALE FORMATIONS

The scope of the sGEIS includes all low permeability shale formations where high volume hydro-fracturing gas drilling will be employed. However, many sections of the document only reference the Marcellus Shale. Environmental impacts associated with other low permeability gas reservoirs where the hydrogeochemistry is different from the Marcellus shale are not addressed in the sGEIS. The sGEIS must be expanded to include potential impacts from other formations.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION

Local Governments need to be involved and informed in all aspects of the drilling process and a procedure for this needs to be in place before drilling begins. Each municipality must receive copies of gas drilling permit applications, including parcel tax map numbers, before any permits are issued by NYSDEC. The NYSDEC should also be required to provide each local municipality and county government with 1) accurate Environmental Inspector contact information for permit coordination between agencies as well as emergency and spill response coordination, and 2) written notification to each municipality of the location of each well-plugging permit application, including tax map parcel number and mapping coordinates.

ACCIDENTS AND VIOLATION REPORTING

Currently the DEC does not have an adequate electronic record-keeping system of violations, accidents, and spills which makes aggregating problems and notifying local governments and residents so difficult as to be nearly impossible. The DEC must bring their violations reporting system into the 21st century by making them easily available to the public electronically.

PROPRIETARY CHEMICALS

The sGEIS allows any “proprietary” chemical constituents not to be subject to public disclosure. It appears that the companies can avoid disclosure if they simply claim the additive is a “trade secret.”The DEC must require full disclosure of all chemicals and additives, including chemical composition of each, used in the hydro-fracturing process.(8.1.3.2,)
The sGEIS only weakly suggests operators “evaluate the use of alternative fracturing additive products that pose less risk.” The DEC must require that the least toxic alternatives be used and then only if proven to not be a danger to the public and the environment.

 

FLOWBACK WATER DISPOSAL

The state must not allow municipal sewage treatment plants to treat drilling wastesbecause such plants are not capable of handling the toxic elements in such wastes. (7.1.8.1)
Some components of drilling waste would normally qualify as hazardous wasteunder state and federal law, but have been exempted from these laws. The DEC must not allow any waste that would qualify as hazardous waste in any other settings to be sent to municipal sewage treatment facilities unable to properly treat it or to disposal wells (here or in other states), putting the health and safety of our waters and communities at grave risk. (1.7.9)

MANAGEMENT OF DRILL CUTTINGS

The plan by the DEC to track the solid and liquid wastes generated in connection with fracking is positive; however tracking of these wastes is said to be the responsibility of the gas industry operators. The DEC must take a more active role in tracking waste that in other settings qualifies as hazardous. The gas industry must not be allowed to oversee itself in this area.(1.7.10)

COMMUNITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS

The DEC needs to do a comprehensive, focused plan to review and analyze the consequences of a full build out of many wells on a community. (1.7.15)
A monetary value must be assigned to potential degradation of the environment in a comprehensive review of community and environmental impacts from drilling.
As proposed, the DEC staff will review the well applications one at a time, without considering the impact of many wells being permitted in close proximity. Impacts on communities must be considered from the standpoint of multiple wells being introduced to an area not one at a time since the industry profits from a high drilling density within an area.
In its considerations of the economics of drilling, the DEC and the State must acknowledge that:
Relatively few local jobs will be produced by the gas companies. Many of the higher paying jobs associated with HVHF go to employees who are residents of other states and will not be paying state income taxes. Likewise, most of the technical field jobs go to transient workers with no social or other connection to the local community. The experience in other communities has demonstrated an increase in crime, local housing costs, and a strain on health care resources (see Sayre Health report).
Small businesses will face higher labor costs as a result of competing with wages paid by the gas companies in order to keep their employees on the job
The sGEIS is incomplete because it does not yet contain the socio-economic analysis of whether there is a balance between risk/reward.

PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS

Primary and Principal Aquifers

Prohibit HVHF near all primary aquifers. The DEC is proposing to prohibit fracking in primary aquifers that serve as public drinking water supplies, but this “prohibition” is only limited to a couple of years after which the state could “reconsider” the bans. In addition, the DEC does not lay out the conditions under which “reconsideration” would be reviewed. The DEC needs to prohibit HVHF near all primary aquifers. 2.4.4.1

Sunset date for buffers

The preliminary draft proposes to place some areas of the state off limits to gas drilling, but upon closer examination, many of the restrictions have sunset dates and some of the protective buffers only call for site-specific individual environmental review, rather than clear restrictions. The DEC needs to strengthen and clarify restrictions and the requirements for buffers and site-specific environmental review.

Mapping of aquifers is Inadequate.

In order to determine a 500 foot buffer to a principal aquifer, the aquifer must be mapped at least to the scale of 1:24,000 feet but many aquifers are only mapped at the 1:250,000 foot scale. The DEC must increase buffer requirements overall but particularly when mapping of the aquifers is inadequate. Part of the fee structure for permitting should go to funding better maps of aquifers throughout the state.  

NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (NORM)

According to James W. Ring, Professor Emeritus of nuclear physics from Hamilton College, the draft sGEIS does not include adequate study of radon in its review of issues. This is a subject which deserves further study before supplies of Marcellus gas are delivered to households where it may endanger the health of citizens. (4.6)

ROAD SPREADING

The DEC has already failed to protect NY drinking water by allowing produced water from PA to be spread on roads in New York State, within Tompkins County, without SEQR review. Road spreading of produced water and brine must be expressly prohibited. (5.13.3.4)

IMPOUNDMENTS

Given the recent history of “100 year rains” occurring every few years and the inherent long-term instability of impoundments, only closed-loop systems for all hydrofracking operations must be permitted. (8.2.2.2)

ROAD PERMITS

The DEC must require, not merely encourage, gas companies to make road use agreements with local municipalities. (8.1.1.4)

COMPULSORY INTEGRATION

New York State is one of the few states to allow compulsory integration and possibly the only one to allow it against individual homeowners. NYS must rescind compulsory integration to respect the rights of its homeowners.

NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

Based on the sGEIS analysis the No Action Alternative is the preferred outcome. Given the clear dangers to the environment and public health of high volume hydraulic fracturing using the current technologies, the lack of significant financial gain for the overwhelming majority of the citizens of New York State and the assured decades-long damage to the way of life of those residing in the gas-drilling regions, the No Action Alternative is the logical and proper finding resulting from this SEQRA study. (9.1)

END

Alfred passes moratorium on hydrofracking in town – Hornell, NY – Hornell Evening Tribune

Alfred passes moratorium on hydrofracking in town – Hornell, NY – Hornell Evening Tribune.

Health Effects of Shale Gas Extraction: 2nd Annual Conference Videos

2011 Presentation Videos | 2nd Annual Conference: Health Effects of Shale Gas Extraction.

Below are links to the videos of the presentations from the 2011 conference where permission was given to record them. These are shown in the order in which they were given:

Gas leases have impact on local real estate market » Local News » The Daily Star, Oneonta, NY – otsego county news, delaware county news, oneonta news, oneonta sports

Gas leases have impact on local real estate market » Local News » The Daily Star, Oneonta, NY – otsego county news, delaware county news, oneonta news, oneonta sports.

Insiders Sound an Alarm Amid a Natural Gas Rush – NYTimes.com

Insiders Sound an Alarm Amid a Natural Gas Rush – NYTimes.com.

June 25, 2011

Insiders Sound an Alarm Amid a Natural Gas Rush

Natural gas companies have been placing enormous bets on the wells they are drilling, saying they will deliver big profits and provide a vast new source of energy for the United States.

But the gas may not be as easy and cheap to extract from shale formations deep underground as the companies are saying, according to hundreds of industry e-mails and internal documents and an analysis of data from thousands of wells.

In the e-mails, energy executives, industry lawyers, state geologists and market analysts voice skepticism about lofty forecasts and question whether companies are intentionally, and even illegally, overstating the productivity of their wells and the size of their reserves. Many of these e-mails also suggest a view that is in stark contrast to more bullish public comments made by the industry, in much the same way that insiders have raised doubts about previous financial bubbles.

“Money is pouring in” from investors even though shale gas is “inherently unprofitable,” an analyst from PNC Wealth Management, an investment company, wrote to a contractor in a February e-mail. “Reminds you of dot-coms.”

“The word in the world of independents is that the shale plays are just giant Ponzi schemes and the economics just do not work,” an analyst from IHS Drilling Data, an energy research company, wrote in an e-mail on Aug. 28, 2009.

Company data for more than 10,000 wells in three major shale gas formations raise further questions about the industry’s prospects. There is undoubtedly a vast amount of gas in the formations. The question remains how affordably it can be extracted.

The data show that while there are some very active wells, they are often surrounded by vast zones of less-productive wells that in some cases cost more to drill and operate than the gas they produce is worth. Also, the amount of gas produced by many of the successful wells is falling much faster than initially predicted by energy companies, making it more difficult for them to turn a profit over the long run.

If the industry does not live up to expectations, the impact will be felt widely. Federal and state lawmakers are considering drastically increasing subsidies for the natural gas business in the hope that it will provide low-cost energy for decades to come.

But if natural gas ultimately proves more expensive to extract from the ground than has been predicted, landowners, investors and lenders could see their investments falter, while consumers will pay a price in higher electricity and home heating bills.

There are implications for the environment, too. The technology used to get gas flowing out of the ground — called hydraulic fracturing, or hydrofracking — can require over a million gallons of water per well, and some of that water must be disposed of because it becomes contaminated by the process. If shale gas wells fade faster than expected, energy companies will have to drill more wells or hydrofrack them more often, resulting in more toxic waste.

The e-mails were obtained through open-records requests or provided to The New York Times by industry consultants and analysts who say they believe that the public perception of shale gas does not match reality; names and identifying information were redacted to protect these people, who were not authorized to communicate publicly. In the e-mails, some people within the industry voice grave concerns.

“And now these corporate giants are having an Enron moment,” a retired geologist from a major oil and gas company wrote in a February e-mail about other companies invested in shale gas. “They want to bend light to hide the truth.”

Others within the industry remain optimistic. They argue that shale gas economics will improve as the price of gas rises, technology evolves and demand for gas grows with help from increased federal subsidies being considered by Congress. “Shale gas supply is only going to increase,” Steven C. Dixon, executive vice president of Chesapeake Energy, said at an energy industry conference in April in response to skepticism about well performance.

Studying the Data

“I think we have a big problem.”

Deborah Rogers, a member of the advisory committee of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, recalled saying that in a May 2010 conversation with a senior economist at the Reserve, Mine K. Yucel. “We need to take a close look at this right away,” she added.

A former stockbroker with Merrill Lynch, Ms. Rogers said she started studying well data from shale companies in October 2009 after attending a speech by the chief executive of Chesapeake, Aubrey K. McClendon. The math was not adding up, Ms. Rogers said. Her research showed that wells were petering out faster than expected.

“These wells are depleting so quickly that the operators are in an expensive game of ‘catch-up,’ ” Ms. Rogers wrote in an e-mail on Nov. 17, 2009, to a petroleum geologist in Houston, who wrote back that he agreed.

“This could have profound consequences for our local economy,” she explained in the e-mail.

Fort Worth residents were already reeling from the sudden reversal of fortune for the natural gas industry.

In early 2008, energy companies were scrambling in Fort Worth to get residents to lease their land for drilling as they searched for so-called monster wells. Billboards along the highways stoked the boom-time excitement: “If you don’t have a gas lease, get one!” Oil and gas companies were in a fierce bidding war for drilling rights, offering people bonuses as high as $27,500 per acre for signing leases.

The actor Tommy Lee Jones signed on as a pitchman for Chesapeake, one of the largest shale gas companies. “The extremely long-term benefits include new jobs and capital investment and royalties and revenues that pay for public roads, schools and parks,” he said in one television advertisement about drilling in the Barnett shale in and around Fort Worth.

To investors, shale companies had a more sophisticated pitch. With better technology, they had refined a “manufacturing model,” they said, that would allow them to drop a well virtually anywhere in certain parts of a shale formation and expect long-lasting returns.

For Wall Street, this was the holy grail: a low-risk and high-profit proposition. But by late 2008, the recession took hold and the price of natural gas plunged by nearly two-thirds, throwing the drilling companies’ business model into a tailspin.

In Texas, the advertisements featuring Mr. Jones disappeared. Energy companies rescinded high-priced lease offers to thousands of residents, which prompted class-action lawsuits. Royalty checks dwindled. Tax receipts fell.

The impact of the downturn was immediate for many.

“Ruinous, that’s how I’d describe it,” said the Rev. Kyev Tatum, president of the Fort Worth chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Mr. Tatum explained that dozens of black churches in Fort Worth signed leases on the promise of big money. Instead, some churches were told that their land may no longer be tax exempt even though they had yet to make any royalties on the wells, he said.

That boom-and-bust volatility had raised eyebrows among people like Ms. Rogers, as well as energy analysts and geologists, who started looking closely at the data on wells’ performance.

In May 2010, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas called a meeting to discuss the matter after prodding from Ms. Rogers. One speaker was Kenneth B. Medlock III, an energy expert at Rice University, who described a promising future for the shale gas industry in the United States. When he was done, Ms. Rogers peppered him with questions.

Might growing environmental concerns raise the cost of doing business? If wells were dying off faster than predicted, how many new wells would need to be drilled to meet projections?

Mr. Medlock conceded that production in the Barnett shale formation — or “play,” in industry jargon — was indeed flat and would probably soon decline.

“Activity will shift toward other plays because the returns there are higher,” he predicted. Ms. Rogers turned to the other commissioners to see if they shared her skepticism, but she said she saw only blank stares.

Bubbling Doubts

Some doubts about the industry are being raised by people who work inside energy companies, too.

“Our engineers here project these wells out to 20-30 years of production and in my mind that has yet to be proven as viable,” wrote a geologist at Chesapeake in a March 17 e-mail to a federal energy analyst. “In fact I’m quite skeptical of it myself when you see the % decline in the first year of production.”

“In these shale gas plays no well is really economic right now,” the geologist said in a previous e-mail to the same official on March 16. “They are all losing a little money or only making a little bit of money.”

Around the same time the geologist sent the e-mail, Mr. McClendon, Chesapeake’s chief executive, told investors, “It’s time to get bullish on natural gas.”

In September 2009, a geologist from ConocoPhillips, one of the largest producers of natural gas in the Barnett shale, warned in an e-mail to a colleague that shale gas might end up as “the world’s largest uneconomic field.” About six months later, the company’s chief executive, James J. Mulva, described natural gas as “nature’s gift,” adding that “rather than being expensive, shale gas is often the low-cost source.” Asked about the e-mail, John C. Roper, a spokesman for ConocoPhillips, said he absolutely believed that shale gas is economically viable.

A big attraction for investors is the increasing size of the gas reserves that some companies are reporting. Reserves — in effect, the amount of gas that a company says it can feasibly access from its wells — are important because they are a central measure of an oil and gas company’s value.

Forecasting these reserves is a tricky science. Early predictions are sometimes lowered because of drops in gas prices, as happened in 2008. Intentionally overbooking reserves, however, is illegal because it misleads investors. Industry e-mails, mostly from 2009 and later, include language from oil and gas executives questioning whether other energy companies are doing just that.

The e-mails do not explicitly accuse any companies of breaking the law. But the number of e-mails, the seniority of the people writing them, the variety of positions they hold and the language they use — including comparisons to Ponzi schemes and attempts to “con” Wall Street — suggest that questions about the shale gas industry exist in many corners.

“Do you think that there may be something suspicious going with the public companies in regard to booking shale reserves?” a senior official from Ivy Energy, an investment firm specializing in the energy sector, wrote in a 2009 e-mail.

A former Enron executive wrote in 2009 while working at an energy company: “I wonder when they will start telling people these wells are just not what they thought they were going to be?” He added that the behavior of shale gas companies reminded him of what he saw when he worked at Enron.

Production data, provided by companies to state regulators and reviewed by The Times, show that many wells are not performing as the industry expected. In three major shale formations — the Barnett in Texas, the Haynesville in East Texas and Louisiana and the Fayetteville, across Arkansas — less than 20 percent of the area heralded by companies as productive is emerging as likely to be profitable under current market conditions, according to the data and industry analysts.

Richard K. Stoneburner, president and chief operating officer of Petrohawk Energy, said that looking at entire shale formations was misleading because some companies drilled only in the best areas or had lower costs. “Outside those areas, you can drill a lot of wells that will never live up to expectations,” he added.

Although energy companies routinely project that shale gas wells will produce gas at a reasonable rate for anywhere from 20 to 65 years, these companies have been making such predictions based on limited data and a certain amount of guesswork, since shale drilling is a relatively new practice.

Most gas companies claim that production will drop sharply after the first few years but then level off, allowing most wells to produce gas for decades.

Gas production data reviewed by The Times suggest that many wells in shale gas fields do not level off the way many companies predict but instead decline steadily.

“This kind of data is making it harder and harder to deny that the shale gas revolution is being oversold,” said Art Berman, a Houston-based geologist who worked for two decades at Amoco and has been one of the most vocal skeptics of shale gas economics.

The Barnett shale, which has the longest production history, provides the most reliable case study for predicting future shale gas potential. The data suggest that if the wells’ production continues to decline in the current manner, many will become financially unviable within 10 to 15 years.

A review of more than 9,000 wells, using data from 2003 to 2009, shows that — based on widely used industry assumptions about the market price of gas and the cost of drilling and operating a well — less than 10 percent of the wells had recouped their estimated costs by the time they were seven years old.

Terry Engelder, a professor of geosciences at Pennsylvania State University, said the debate over long-term well performance was far from resolved. The Haynesville shale has not lived up to early expectations, he said, but industry projections have become more accurate and some wells in the Marcellus shale, which stretches from Virginia to New York, are outperforming expectations.

A Sense of Confidence

Many people within the industry remain confident.

“I wouldn’t worry about these shale companies,” said T. Boone Pickens, the oil and gas industry executive, adding that he believes that if prices rise, shale gas companies will make good money.

Mr. Pickens said that technological improvements — including hydrofracking wells more than once — are already making production more cost-effective, which is why some major companies like ExxonMobil have recently bought into shale gas.

Shale companies are also adjusting their strategies to make money by focusing on shale wells that produce lucrative liquids, like propane and butane, in addition to natural gas.

Asked about the e-mails from the Chesapeake geologist casting doubt on company projections, a Chesapeake spokesman, Jim Gipson, said the company was fully confident that a majority of wells would be productive for 30 years or more.

David Pendery, a spokesman for IHS, added that though shale gas prospects had previously been debated by many analysts, in more recent years costs had fallen and technology had improved.

Still, in private exchanges, many industry insiders are skeptical, even cynical, about the industry’s pronouncements. “All about making money,” an official from Schlumberger, an oil and gas services company, wrote in a July 2010 e-mail to a former federal regulator about drilling a well in Europe, where some United States shale companies are hunting for better market opportunities.

“Looks like crap,” the Schlumberger official wrote about the well’s performance, according to the regulator, “but operator will flip it based on ‘potential’ and make some money on it.”

“Always a greater sucker,” the e-mail concluded.

Robbie Brown contributed reporting from Atlanta.

State Democrats Table Votes On Hydrofracking Ban, Millionaires’ Tax At Testy Meeting | Politics on the Hudson

State Democrats Table Votes On Hydrofracking Ban, Millionaires’ Tax At Testy Meeting | Politics on the Hudson.

Considering Shale Gas Extraction in North Carolina: Lessons from Other States — Nicholas Institute

Considering Shale Gas Extraction in North Carolina: Lessons from Other States — Nicholas Institute.

The Fracturing of Pennsylvania – NYTimes.com

The Fracturing of Pennsylvania – NYTimes.com.

Dr. Marvin Resnikoff – Radioactivity in the Marcellus Shale on Vimeo

Dr. Marvin Resnikoff – Radioactivity in the Marcellus Shale on Vimeo on Vimeo

via Dr. Marvin Resnikoff – Radioactivity in the Marcellus Shale on Vimeo.

Dr. Marvin Resnikoff – Radioactivity in the Marcellus Shale
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8 months ago
Dr. Marvin Resnikoff spoke at Binghamton University on 11/16/2011 about where the radioactivity from Marcellus Shale gas drilling goes after it comes up out of the ground. He discussed the DEC’s currently-proposed regulations and described some gas-drilling-related problems in Texas. He then addressed numerous questions from the audience.

One fascinating (and frightening) tidbit from his presentation was that radon gas comes into people’s homes along with natural gas when they use it for heating or cooking. Watch the video to see Dr. Resnikoff’s staggering estimate of the number of additional deaths from lung cancer that are statistically attributable to this influx of radon gas.

Poll says most in Pa. see more pros than cons in shale industry

Poll says most in Pa. see more pros than cons in shale industry.